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Abstract
In examining one’s level of religious involvement and orthodoxy of worship,
several authors have found significant correlations between levels of these variables and
an attachment to political parties, particularly the Republican Party (Layman, 1997). My
analysis of a 2002 ABC News/Washington Post poll (ICPSR, 2002) finds that the same
mechanism that is indicative of partisanship also influences and reinforces evangelicals’
sympathies toward Israel. While the Republican and Evangelical variables are
statistically significant with respect to an elevated level of sympathy toward Israel, the
interaction effect of these two variables is the most noteworthy product of this analysis.
When subjects respond as being both Republican and Evangelical, the size of the
coefficient is at its strongest and most significant. This finding supports the hypothesized
mechanism: the evangelicals’ inherent sympathy toward Israel is related to their level of
religiosity and is reinforced by their membership in the Republican Party. This is due to
the fact that the Republican Party also has an interest in sympathizing with the State of
Israel, much like the Democratic Party. The relationship between membership in the
Republican Party and evangelicalism is largely based on the previous studies of Guth and
Green (1986, 1987) and Layman (1997). The mechanism implied by these scholars, and
used for this analysis, is the result of the consistency of the evangelicals’ conservative
standing on domestic social issues and the corresponding position of the Republican
Party on the same issues. This position is markedly different than the Democratic Party’s
stance. Therefore, this difference in parties predisposes evangelicals to the Republican
Party. Rather than the result of an arbitrary decision, the Republican evangelical
constituency, initially founded on domestic social issues, must be satisfied with their
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party’s policies toward Israel. This notion represents a level of reinforcement that is not
present under other partisanship interactions.
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Introduction
Various studies have established links between both denominational affiliation
and salience of religion when looking at ideology, voting behavior, and issue preference.
Furthermore, several articles have linked the orthodoxy of one’s religious worship to
partisanship. Rather than operating on the differences between denominations or
religions, as previously found, this new divide operates on varying degrees of religiosity
within denominations or religions. The foundations of this religiosity and religious
salience are directly related to orthodoxy of worship (Layman, 1997). In the case of
religious support of Israel, my analysis applies similar mechanisms to evangelicals’
probabilities of sympathizing with Israel, and their use of the Republican Party as a
vehicle of influence on foreign policy toward the State of Israel. Using an ABC News
and Washington Post survey conducted in April of 2002, my analysis will examine the
effects of partisanship and religiosity on a Protestants’ likelihood of sympathizing with
Israel (ICPSR, 2002).
Authors like Layman (1997) have shown that more focus should be placed on
one’s level of religiosity, rather than nominal distinctions like religion or denomination,
when considering partisanship. Given that religiosity has also become such a pertinent
variable in the prediction of partisanship, the literature below is used to develop a variety
of mechanisms by which the partisanship of worshippers can be influenced by their
religion or degree of religiosity. The goal of this essay is to examine whether the
religious mechanisms recognized to influence partisanship and ideology can also affect
one’s stance on a specific issue. Specifically, my analysis of the 2002 ABC
News/Washington Post poll will examine the factors and mechanisms that influence the
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political outlook of evangelicals, and if they can be extended to show an effect on that
population’s likelihood of being sympathetic toward Israel. This analysis will examine
the variety of politicizing mechanisms related to religious worship and how they may
affect evangelicals’ level of sympathy for Israel. It will also address the role one’s
partisanship plays in possibly solidifying the inherent level of sympathy found in the
doctrine and increased level of worship of evangelicals.
Evidence shows that both major political parties in the United States, Democratic
and Republican, espouse relatively equal and unwavering support for the state of Israel
(Smith, p122). Since a more orthodox level of worship of most Christian religions
correlates with Republicanism, this essay will examine the extent to which that
politicization and attraction translates into stronger support for sympathetic policies
toward Israel. My analysis posits that the prominence of domestic social issues among
evangelicals drives them to the Republican Party. It is, therefore, not an arbitrary
decision when evangelicals decide to influence the Republican Party in an attempt to
further policies that are sympathetic toward Israel. One may assume, however, that this
decision is random when considering the comparable levels of sympathy toward Israel
that emanate from both the Democratic and Republican Parties. A closer look at other
issues that drive groups to a particular party explains this confusion.
Furthermore, my analysis will explore internal dynamics that may contribute to
the Republican Party’s ability to reinforce the inherently sympathetic view of Israel held
by evangelicals. By having a large constituency of evangelicals initially sensitized by
domestic social issues, the Republican Party must be sensitive to the issue of Israel. It is
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this issue that is of relatively high importance to the same evangelical constituency also
driven to the party for its stance on other political issues.
The broad ranging support of both the Democratic and Republican Parties for
Israel is a product of several political forces. Because the continued safety and existence
of the state of Israel is significant to many religious groups, their work to maintain a
friendly U.S. foreign policy is logical. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the causal
factors that drive a religious organization like the evangelicals to an alliance with the
Republican Party, rather than the Democratic. If both parties are proponents of a
persistent and friendly relationship with Israel, the prevailing issues that have attracted
more orthodox worshippers to the Republican Party need to be examined when assessing
which factors drive worshippers to the Republican Party to affect policy toward Israel.
Both the role of the religion and the role of the party are mutually reinforcing and
should be separately significant in influencing one’s support for Israel. I hypothesize that
the Republican Party will, in effect, be more sympathetic toward Israel than the
Democratic Party for two reasons: to prevent its evangelical constituency from seeking
out the Democratic Party as a vehicle of influence on Israeli affairs; as well as to maintain
the support of this more socially conservative constituency on domestic political issues.
This socially conservative constituency is one that the Democratic Party lacks because of
its stance on the very same domestic issues. The resulting hypothesis states that a higher
degree of religiosity, as well as self-described membership in the Republican Party, will
be indicative of a higher level of sympathy toward Israel. While the Republican Party’s
level of rhetorical sympathy and support for Israel may seem comparable to that of the
Democratic Party’s, I assert that its more informal constituency maintenance rhetoric
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directed at supportive evangelical groups is much more explicit and sympathetic than that
of the Democratic Party’s. The Democratic Party’s rhetoric is, therefore, more of a
general speaking point that is not readily tailored to a particular and cohesive
constituency like the evangelical movement. This is expected to result in a higher degree
of sympathy toward Israel among evangelical Republicans than among evangelical
Democrats.
The means by which such politicization can affect the opinions of religious
groups continually reverts back to the salience of one’s religion in his/her life. This
factor dictates the importance of both Israel and the domestic social issues that are
indicative of partisanship in the first place. My analysis will take Layman’s (1997)
analysis a step further by reapplying the implications of orthodoxy of worship to one’s
sympathy toward Israel, rather than just partisanship. Such an approach has the effect of
isolating the implications of different levels of religiosity, as well as membership in each
political party. The dynamics surrounding the basis of this issue, U.S. support for Israel,
have significant ramifications on international relations, domestic politics, and national
security.
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Literature Review
Doctrines and Religious Politicization
Geoffrey Layman (1997) studied the implications of religious affiliation and
commitment on the ideology and partisanship of voters. In “Religion and Political
Behavior in the United States”, Layman shows that a cleavage has grown between people
of varying degrees of orthodox worship, supplemental to the established cleavage
between different denominational affiliations and their respective traditions. Orthodoxy
is presented by Layman as a matter of varying degrees of salience of religion in the lives
of individual people, rather than differences in the particular denomination worshipped.
Since 1980 one’s denomination has declined in importance as it relates to partisanship
(Layman, 1997). Rather, measures of orthodoxy and commitment began to show a
significant relationship with political behavior and partisanship (Layman, 1997).
The analyses below rest on Layman’s theoretical conceptions of ‘orthodox’,
versus ‘liberal’, worshipers. ‘Orthodox’ worship, as used by Layman, refers to those
people who strictly adhere to the traditional interpretations, translations, and practices of
their religion. This conception must be kept separate from some more traditional uses of
the term ‘orthodox.’ The ‘liberal’ versus ‘orthodox’ distinction implies that people who
more strictly adhere to their religion’s doctrine hold it to be more salient in their lives.
This is implicit throughout Layman’s analysis. Therefore, in the context of partisanship,
the concept of ‘orthodoxy of worship’ can be viewed as a matter of both salience and
level of involvement. Not addressing the implied measures of religious salience
presented by Layman would cause the concepts he uses to lack clarity. This is especially
true when considering the array of saliency measures presented throughout this analysis.
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Layman shows that level of involvement is highly correlated with the orthodoxy
of one’s worship. As will be shown throughout this analysis, each measure has some
connection to the salience of one’s religion, otherwise known as religiosity. Level of
involvement is most commonly measured by one’s frequency of attendance. Often,
frequency of attendance is combined with more direct measures of salience to gauge
one’s level of religiosity. As will be shown later, measuring the saliency of one’s
religion has taken many forms. While each measure attempts to gauge religiosity in a
relatively indirect manner, they are often combined or seen as interchangeable. The
following sections will address some of the methodological issues related to the
interchangeability of measures of saliency, as well as the measures themselves. It is
important to examine the nature and dynamics surrounding the three most common
measures associated with studying religiosity as it relates to politicization: orthodoxy of
worship, involvement/frequency of attendance, and salience (see Appendix A for
comparison and characteristics).
After an evaluation of the pertinent literature, the negative aspects of each
measure will show that they are less effective than the use of the evangelical distinction
within the Protestant faiths. While each of the above measures is more broadly
applicable than the evangelical distinction, the question of sympathy toward Israel within
the Protestant population does not require such a broadly applicable measure.
Furthermore, the evangelical distinction does not possess any of the subjectivity or
measurement problems that I argue are present in other measures, especially when they
are applied as broadly as they have been. The following literature examines the some of
the common applications of each of the measures.
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Orthodoxy of Worship
Layman asserts that the distinction between ‘orthodox’ worship and a more
relaxed adherence to the social and moral stances associated with “liberal” worship has
direct implications on party choice and, in turn, policy preference. He also notes that the
effects of orthodoxy may be seen more readily on issue preference than on partisanship
(Layman 1997, p298). This is because the latter involves the unlikely political
solidification of a party’s elites to create a more coherent platform to present to the voters
(Layman 1997, p295). For this to occur, clear and consistent decisions must be made by
party elites to create a defined moral and social platform that is easily understood by the
average voter. Layman notes that such a clear and consistent party platform has rarely
been reached. When, and if, this clarity and consistency does occur, less information
must be processed when deciding which party to identify with. This ability to process
information is the main means by which the public can identify with a certain party or
ideology.
Single issues, on the other hand, present voters with a decision based on the
assessment of far fewer variables than deciding partisanship. Layman asserts that this is
why it may be more appropriate to use the orthodoxy of worship measure when
examining issues, rather than parties (Layman, 1997, p.298). As the differences between
measures of religiosity are developed throughout this section, an appropriate measure for
distinguishing between respondents’ religiosity and their level of sympathy toward Israel
will be developed within the framework of an orthodoxy measure.
With the exception of Jews (Layman 1997, p301), Orthodox worshippers (as
interpreted above), tend to vote for the more conservative candidate, party, or platform
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(Layman 1997, p303). Religious liberals and secularists tend toward the more liberal
party choices (Green, Guth, and Frasier, 1991; Green et al, 1996; Guth and Green, 1986,
1987). This difference has grown over time, as the social distinctions and issues
surrounding each party have become more defined and divisive. Layman’s work does
not focus on the finer mechanisms of religious socialization. However, his analysis
serves to reinforce links between religious adherence and the partisanship or ideology
that is most amenable to it. Several other authors pursue these links with measures other
than ‘orthodoxy of worship.’
In contrast to ‘orthodox worship’, the concept of ‘liberal worship’ refers to
subjects who adhere less strictly to their religious doctrine and tradition. Layman finds
that these liberal worshippers have a logical and inherent decrease in the saliency of their
religion (Layman 1997, p289). Furthermore, Layman’s characterizations of orthodox and
liberal worshippers can be supplanted with a variety of terms that must also be kept clear
to preserve their meaning. Confusion quickly arises when discussing ‘liberal
worshippers’ and those who tend to vote for liberal political candidates. Regardless,
strict adherents (orthodox) tend to support conservative candidates, and more moderate
adherents and secularists (liberalists) tend toward the liberal end of the political spectrum.
The latter also tends to embrace a more liberal social and political outlook (Hunter, 1991;
Kellstedt and Green, 1993; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Layman, 1997). According to
Layman, this is opposite to those of strict religious adherence and their implied high
religious salience (Layman 1997, p289).
This theoretical and empirical connection made by the authors above will be
applied further in this analysis to see if issue continuity between religions and political
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parties can be consciously recognized, with respect to sympathy toward Israel. Layman’s
(1997) analysis showed a link between orthodoxy and partisanship. However, orthodox
worship is often synonymous with frequency of attendance. This comes from the implicit
notion that those who more strictly adhere to their respective religious doctrines hold
their religion to be more important. They also attend religious services more often
(Layman, 1997). While this correlation between religiosity, orthodoxy, and frequency of
attendance is broadly accepted, it is important to clearly assess the relationship one’s
frequency of attendance has with evaluating religiosity.
Involvement and Frequency of Attendance
For one to be highly committed or involved in a religion through attendance at
worship services, it logically follows that religion would have to be a highly salient part
of that person’s life. Each of these factors is strongly interrelated. Wald, Kellstedt, and
Leege (1993, p126) assert that “…salience attributed to religion, the guidance received
from religion, and a composite measure of private devotionalism…all rose monotonically
with the level of church involvement.” This finding is a pivotal point in the theoretical
development of the current measure. These notions of involvement and commitment are
traditionally measured by the “frequency of attendance at corporate worship services”
(Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p125). However, there are measurement problems
associated with the use of attendance within the traditions of certain religions and
denominations.
With Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege’s (1993) use of frequency of attendance as a
measure of saliency, the authors often use the term “involvement” interchangeably with
frequency of attendance. This term connotes the devotion that is implied when
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discussing the one’s commitment to frequently attend worship services. However, the
authors note that other factors must be accounted for when discussing involvement
(salience) in terms of attendance. For example, the evangelical distinction would be
given too much weight if only attendance were to be used as an indicator of commitment
or involvement (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p127). This is because the traditions
of evangelical worship mandate midweek attendance, unlike most other denominations.
One could argue that Evangelicals are merely adhering to tradition when attending more
frequently, rather than exhibiting a characteristic indicative of higher salience or
commitment. Therefore, one’s religious affiliation must be accounted for to properly
qualify any attendance-related saliency indicators. This act corrects for any traditionspecific factors associated with attendance, as well as showing one’s affiliation with a
specific and defined doctrine. For example, when Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993)
accounted for the religious affiliation variable there were almost as many “very religious”
Catholics as Evangelical Protestants, despite a difference in their frequency of
attendance. This idea is depicted in Appendix B.
Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993, p127) conclude that the correct measure of
salience should include frequency of attendance, religious orientation, and some direct
measure of salience, if possible. This is the measure of one’s religious “involvement”
used throughout Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege’s analysis. However, their use of this term
“involvement” is problematic. Most other authors use this term to refer to the frequency
of one’s attendance. Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege use “involvement” to refer to a kind of
umbrella term for religiosity. As noted above, involvement refers to how dedicated
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someone is by implying spirituality is directly correlated with attendance, regardless of
other factors.
Following the conclusion that one’s tradition of worship, or orientation, must be
accounted for, Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege prescribe a limit on the possible responses to
the frequency of attendance variable when attempting to account for “involvement.”
When combining this measure with other salience or affiliation variables, there should
not be a “more than weekly” response option. “Weekly” should be the choice indicating
the highest possible frequency of attendance at corporate worship services (Wald,
Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p135). When one’s religion or denomination is accounted for
along with this measure, undue weight is not given to evangelicals because of their
religious traditions (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p127). While this methodological
adjustment does correct for some problems in the measure it does not satisfy the problem
associated with correlating religiosity with attendance alone. This measure of attendance
has no means of gauging whether or not a respondent is merely attending worship
services frequently because of family tradition. More directly, the respondent could
merely be going through the motions. Finally, Layman and Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege
often refer to a direct survey question to measure salience. Use of this direct salience
measure, however, is also problematic and worth examining.
Salience
A more direct survey measure of one’s religiosity is often combined with other
measures to create a more accurate one. For example, a survey question that asks, “How
important is your religion to you?” can be combined with attendance and religious
affiliation to create a measure of religiosity. This approach, however, encounters one
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serious problem. A respondent’s assessment of the saliency of his or her own religion is
highly subjective. A situation can easily be imagined where “very important” does not
mean the same thing to different respondents. Being that measures like frequency of
attendance are highly correlated with religiosity and salience, the use of a direct question
about religious importance has become pointless.
As the sections above have shown, each of the measures discussed (orthodoxy of
worship, frequency of attendance, and a direct salience survey question) has faults that
are largely related to their application within analyses. My use of the evangelical
distinction as a measure of religiosity applied to one’s likelihood of sympathizing with
Israel solves many of the methodological problems associated with the measures above.
First, the evangelical distinction is not as subjective as a survey question asking about
one’s salience of religion. Secondly, this distinction is not applied to a broad population
that cuts across quite different religious traditions and denominations. Rather, the
evangelical distinction serves to segregate mainstream Protestants from Protestants with a
higher degree of religiosity, i.e. evangelicals. While my analysis of the 2002 ABC
News/Washington Post poll shows that evangelicals attend church more often than other
Protestants, the most significant contribution of this measure comes from the actual
meaning and tradition that accompanies an evangelical form of worship. The following
section gives a more synthesized view of all of the measures discussed, while placing this
analysis’ evangelical measure in context.
The Measures in Context
Those with elevated levels of religiosity in their lives tend to support and identify
with more conservative political actors (Layman, 1997). This theoretical connection
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between high saliency, strict adherence, and a tendency towards the political right comes
from the general idea that if one holds their religion to be more important in their lives
they are more likely to follow its doctrine more closely. It also follows that the platform
of a like-minded party is much more likely to gain those religious worshippers’ support.
The doctrines of most religions examined by Layman (1997) are in accordance with the
moral, social, and political stances of the more conservative Republican Party.
Therefore, it is logical that the alliance between stricter, more orthodox, worshippers and
the Republican Party is based on a broad range of domestic social issues.
One article appeared in major newspapers noting the probable importance of
religion in the 2004 presidential election (USA Today, 2004). This article references the
work of Green and Guth (1986, 1987), and draws on many of the findings of Wald,
Kellstedt, and Leege (1993). The article shows that the variable most indicative of how
one will vote in the 2004 presidential election is one’s frequency of attendance. The
voters who attend more frequently will vote Republican, while those who attend less
frequently will more likely vote for the Democratic candidate. These findings are in no
way controversial when considering the analyses above. However, it is important to note
that both Green and Guth interchangeably use different measures of religiosity in this
article.
Even in the relatively brief USA Today article, frequency of attendance is often
supplanted with whether or not one is an evangelical Protestant or an Orthodox Jew. The
scholars referenced seem to be relying on the known link between orthodoxy of worship,
involvement, and religiosity. Implied in the interchangeability of these measures is the
idea that tradition or religion-specific factors do tend to be indicative of elevated salience
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or religiosity. This supports the common view that frequency of attendance and some
nominal denominational distinctions can often be used to effectively measure ones
religiosity. The correlation between these factors is so high that these authors seem to
have found them to be synonymous, and they often used them interchangeably when
making such generalizations.
If respondents label themselves as evangelical, the authors in the USA Today
article imply that there is some factor that has driven the respondents to label themselves
as an evangelical Protestant, and not just a Protestant. As my hypothesis states, the very
nature of the evangelical distinction connotes a higher frequency of attendance. This is
arguably due, however, to that faith’s traditions. More importantly, however, the
evangelical distinction seems to connote a relatively higher degree of salience when
compared to non-evangelical Protestants (USA Today, 2004). The nature of this
evangelical distinction without the complications of frequency of attendance will be
examined in a more comprehensive manner below.
After establishing that the degree of religious saliency in one’s life has a strong
bearing over such choices as party identification, one must question the role that the
church plays in the conceptualization of political issues. The remainder of this analysis
more directly examines the overt and latent mechanisms by which the correlation
between politics and religiosity is made possible. As noted above, the roles of the church
and its worshippers are pivotal in this process. It is unlikely that the initial connections
made between the church and the Republican Party were purely the result of isolated
individuals coming to their own conclusion after careful consideration and research. The
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interaction between a religion and its worshippers involves many mechanisms operating
to actively influence partisanship or issue preference.
In Layman (1997), the subjects were able to find a political party or issue position
that most closely approximated their views; views based largely on their respective
religious doctrine. This is the very mechanism that has created the religiosity-based
correlation used throughout this analysis. The role of the religious organization, the
community of worshippers, and its leadership will become quite apparent and central to
the theory at hand. The broad nature of ideologies and parties makes the effects of
religion seem quite limited when considering the possible presence of other confounding
factors. However, political connections by worshippers are more readily made when
considering single issues, as opposed to entire party platforms (Layman, 1997 p298).
This means that religious mechanisms cannot be the deciding factor in every decision
made by a devout worshipper. This analysis does assert, on the other hand, that an issue
central to one’s faith and political beliefs is more significantly affected by religious
mechanisms. The significance of Israel to Protestants, and especially evangelical
Protestants, is an ideal context within which to test the effects of elevated religiosity and
partisanship on one’s likelihood of sympathizing with Israel.
This analysis seeks to explore the possibility of a linkage that is analogous to the
one made between one’s level of adherence to the content of a religious body’s doctrine
and a political party’s stances on domestic social issues. The question is whether or not
sufficient mechanisms exist within the religious community to sensitize, mobilize, and
politicize a specific population of worshippers toward an issue. While several factors
influence such decisions, when the discussion is narrowed to more focused issues, the
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possible ideas and mechanisms involved become clearer. Even with a narrower
conception of influence and support, this analysis must next specify the mechanisms and
measures that constitute the analogous application of orthodoxy, attendance, and
partisanship that has been examined to this point.
Within a population of Protestants, the distinction between evangelical Protestants
and mainline Protestants satisfies many of the above-established criteria for an accurate
measure of the religiosity’s effects on sympathy toward Israel. First, examining an issue
that cuts across denominations and specific faiths would relegate a researcher to use the
more subjective salience measure that is derived from survey questions. This is because
not all denominations, or religions, have as commonly accepted beliefs as those shared
between evangelicals and mainstream Protestants. Therefore, more than one measure of
religiosity would have to be used in the same analysis. Secondly, using the evangelical
distinction within the Protestant denomination does not rely solely on attendance’s
correlation with devotion. Rather, it relies on a relatively less subjective assessment of
one’s own nominal distinction as it relates to devotion and the concept of being an
evangelical. Finally, Israel’s relevance to the Protestant faith and the evangelical
movement makes this particular analysis of religiosity quite appropriate. Given another
issue, a broader assessment of religiosity’s manifestations may be warranted. However,
another appropriate measure would need to be developed.
Religions’ Mechanisms for Sensitizing, Mobilizing, and Politicizing
The literature cited above has established mechanisms by which the moral and
social underpinnings of a religion have been compared and attached to the political
stances of a particular party, ideology, or issue. The analogous attachment of a religious
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doctrine to the issue of sympathy toward Israel will reapply the same mechanisms, and
will more clearly elucidate the overall effect of religion on issue preference. Once a
doctrine is solidly linked to an issue position, the next variable is the ability of a religion
to make supporters of that issue out of its worshippers. Success largely depends on how
much one refers and defers to his/her religion on such decisions, i.e. how salient that
religion is to them. If a worshipper holds the opinion and position of the church in low
regard, he or she is unlikely to defer to it. This also works in the opposite direction.
There are, however, several means by which doctrine of a religion can be transmitted to
the worshipper and subsequently linked to political issues.
A closer look at the mechanisms central to a religion’s ability to politicize and
influence can be divided into three important realms of religious participation:
‘communal’, ‘associational’, and ‘orientational’ (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p124).
These mechanisms are intimately linked to the processing of information by worshippers,
and what effect that information has on their beliefs. One’s religion and denomination are
referred to as an ‘Orientation.’ This was noted above as being an integral part of the
involvement measure, along with frequency of attendance. Communalism can be
described as the “commonality of religious identification among family and friends”
(Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p125). This realm captures the socially constructed
and reinforced aspect of religious adherence.
Finally, associationalism is “equated with public involvement in corporate
religious organizations” (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p125). This concept has been
used in several measures of religiosity. It is most often measured by frequency of
attendance at collective worship along with other church-sponsored activities that
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facilitate worship (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p124). Being that orientationalism
is most amenable to the nominative response of belonging to one religion or
denomination, Wald Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) found that the traditions specific to
these responses must be accounted for (see Fig.1) to negate any effects originating from a
particular religious tradition. Associationalism and communalism both illustrate the
mechanism by which a religion’s doctrine manifests in the life and beliefs of an
individual worshipper or body of worshippers.
Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege demonstrate the communalist and multidimensional
view of religion by showing its effects on Catholic worshippers. The following example
deals with the occasional conflicts of communalism and associationalism:
…For Catholics, communal involvement correlated with commitment to the
Democratic Party, but associationalism bred Republicanism, an anomaly…traced
to the different political priorities of the Catholic community and its hierarchy.
The former [community], viewing politics as an arena to pursue class and status
interests, regarded the Democrats as most representative of their views, while the
church as church regarded the Republicans as the most faithful standard-bearers
of conservative personal morality. The two different forms of Catholicism, the
community and the church, provided conflicting cues that translated into different
partisan commitments (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993).
It follows, theoretically, that the specific issue being examined plays an important role in
determining which aspect of religion will reinforce which beliefs. While these
conflicting mechanisms do not exist for every issue, they are factors that must be
evaluated. Furthermore, the relative importance of each of these realms in the lives of
worshippers indicates the means by which religions influence worshippers. For the
purposes of this paper, there is no foreseeable negative effect associated with the
communal aspect within the issue of likely sympathy toward Israel. Contrary to the
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Catholicism example given above, there are no apparent theoretical disjoints between the
communal and associational aspects of the issue at hand.
The example of Catholicism involved two separate issues at conflict: equality and
personal morality. Within the issue of sympathy toward Israel, mostly derived from the
associational aspect, there does not appear to be a communalistic tension. The context is
much narrow than the party affiliation issue addressed in the Catholicism example above.
In conclusion, awareness of the three factors of religious influence is necessary for valid
conclusions of influence to be drawn. They are inextricably linked to the issue at hand
and must be consciously addressed. With respect to a broader assessment of influence
within religious bodies, it is the religious community that makes the connections between
the values, or agendas, of each religious body and its respective political agenda.
This connection between beliefs and issues involves both the pulpit and social
interaction with fellow parishioners (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993; Wald, Owen, and
Hill 1988, 1990). These connections and influences of the pulpit and fellow worshippers
will vary with the saliency of religion in each person’s life. Referring to the theoretical
connection above, Layman states succinctly, “The impact of religious beliefs and
affiliations on political behavior is greater for those individuals for whom religion is
more salient or who are more involved in their churches than for those individuals who
are less committed” (Layman, 1997 drawing on Kellstedt, 1989; Kellstedt and Green,
1993; Miller and Shanks, 1996). Saliency and its related indicators are a pivotal aspect of
this paper and its assumption of influence. Concurrently, the development of the
evangelical distinction within the Protestant faith is the measure of religiosity for this
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analysis and its attempt to measure the likelihood of a respondent to sympathize with
Israel.
Summary of Mechanisms and Measurement
This paper has established two interrelated mechanisms by which the position of a
religion on a certain issue is transferred to and followed by its worshippers. One of the
most important measures of religiosity is a function of the level of one’s religious
involvement. When a person is more involved in their religion, shown through an
elevated level of devotion or frequency of attendance, that person’s religion is likely to be
a more prominent factor in that person’s life. That same individual is more likely to
ascribe to the political and social beliefs that most closely approximate their religion’s
doctrine. Layman (1997) has been one of the primary scholars to show that such
adherence to religious doctrine is highly predictive of membership in the Republican.
This calculation is actively made by the follower, but is influenced by the actions of the
religious leaders. Several aspects of religious involvement reinforce this politicization,
mobilization, and socialization.
A person is highly involved with his or her respective religion because that part of
his or her life is relatively important to them. Therefore, one would value their religion’s
position on political issues for the same reason their religion is important to them in the
first place. Adherence to the political tendencies most applicable to a strict interpretation
of a religious doctrine is clearly a function of the role and prominence religion has in
one’s life. Scholars, like Layman (1997), have also shown that religiosity significantly
influences one’s partisanship or ideology through the same relationship mechanism of
adherence and influence. This mechanism will be applied to the analysis of religiosity

20

and one’s likelihood of holding a sympathetic view toward Israel. Partisanship will also
be analyzed to show any interacting effects it might have with religiosity when
attempting to predict the probability holding a sympathetic view toward Israel.
The previous discussion of religious mechanisms does not purport to describe an
exhaustive list of pressures faced by a voter. It does, however, account for a body of
noteworthy mechanisms that have significant effects on how religious groups possibly
influence worshippers’ views on specific issues. Regardless of the possible measures
used, the more involved a person is in their religion (frequency of attendance used by
authors) the more salient it is to them (Wald Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993). This salience
translates into stricter adherence to the doctrine and teachings of that religion. For
reasons specific to the difference between mainline and evangelical Protestants, this
distinction will be used as this analysis’ measure of religious salience or involvement.
As noted above, if the teachings of a particular denomination reflect a certain
issue position, the more “involved” person will be more likely to take that stance. This is
because that issue position has been deemed to be most consistent with the doctrine that
is so important in that person’s life. Hence, this level of religiosity is a valid reflection of
one’s likelihood to more consciously hold opinions that are consistent with, and most
likely originate from, their religious involvement. Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993)
label this mechanism ‘associationalism.’ This elevated level of association should result
in a higher likelihood of sympathy toward Israel among evangelical Protestants, as
opposed to mainline Protestants. This, however, can only occur after the prominence of
Israel within the Protestant faith is firmly established, and the evangelical distinction is
validated as a measure of elevated religiosity.
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Finally, to use the idea of a doctrine being consistent with issue positions of a
religious body, one must be conscious of the contents of each religious doctrine.
Assuring continuity between the doctrine of a particular religion and the issue position
that one claims to have been passed on by that religion is the only way to be logically and
theoretically consistent. For example, one could not logically argue that the pro-choice
stance of a respondent was the direct result of a strict adherence to the teachings of the
Catholic Church. This is because the pro-life stance of the Catholic Church is in direct
contradiction to any influence mechanism that rests on involvement. Wald, Kellstedt,
and Leege (1993) call these pertinent doctrinal distinctions “orientations.” They not only
speak to the specific content of the doctrine, but to the traditions of worship that have
direct implications on proposed measures of saliency. These factors of orientation must
be considered before addressing any mechanism of influence.
Once the substance of a doctrine is deemed to be consistent with an issue position
held by a strictly adhering follower, and there are no communalistic tensions, the
mechanisms related to involvement, associationalism, and salience are more clearly
operable. While there is no indicator to demonstrate the relative importance of other
factors like education or family values, the defined nature of a particular issue does
narrow the scope of possible outside factors being higher on a list of possible factors of
influence. Therefore, one could assume that there is less competition for the deference of
the worshipper. Religion takes on a more prominent role.
Several factors could possibly enhance tendencies to defer to religious doctrine or
teachings. Because of its proven influence on partisanship, this analysis focuses on the
salience of religion, rather than other possible factors. The salience of one’s religion
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shows itself in levels of involvement, attendance, denominations, and responses to
saliency questions. To develop a theory of influence by a religion toward a certain
position on an issue, one must account for the doctrine and the agenda of those behind the
pulpit. Evidence of evangelical and devout Protestants’ support for Israel must be clear.
It is because of this evidence that the sample population of respondents within the 2002
ABC News/Washington Post survey has been chosen to show the hypothesized
politicizing mechanisms with respect to sympathy toward Israel (ICPSR, 2002).
Linkages between worshippers, religious leaders, and political issues must be established
for the present theory of influence to come full course. Establishing a mechanism of
influence by a religious body or political party is problematic if one cannot establish the
substance of what is being transmitted.
Religion and Support for Israel
To test the existence of the above-hypothesized mechanisms of religious
influence, opinions of Israel within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict will be
analyzed. There are a variety of logical means by which one could come to support
Israel. This is also true for the Palestinian and Arab side of the conflict. However, in
keeping with the initial doctrinal linkage established by Layman when examining the
ideology of orthodox worshippers, this analysis rests on the continuity between the
religious doctrine and support for Israel, as opposed to partisanship. Use of the
evangelical distinction as a measure of salience must be clarified, because it relates to
many of the measurements and mechanisms of involvement and salience presented
above.
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The few characteristics that differ between mainline Protestants and evangelical
Protestants gain relevance when analyzing the level of religiosity among each population.
One of these distinctions rests on the literal interpretation of the Bible, as opposed to an
interpretation held and espoused by religious hierarchy, church elites, or other
charismatic elites. The distinction between evangelicals and other Protestants has
endured a number of changes throughout the last couple of centuries. This is partially
because the concept of ‘evangelicalism’ has also fluctuated in recent history. The current
usage of the term ‘evangelical’ rests largely on the preservation of the divine authority of
the Bible (Marsden, 1991).
The evangelical movement, made up of many subgroups, places great importance
on this “literal exposition” of the Bible (Marsden, 1991). Subgroups of the evangelical
movement, however, have focused on the adherence to the written word with varying
degrees of militancy. George W. Dollar notes that fundamentalist evangelicals, the
largest subgroup of the evangelical movement, distinguish themselves from other
evangelicals by their willingness to defend a literal interpretation of the Bible with
militant actions (Marsden, p24). Regardless of this fundamentalist subgroup’s militant
fervor, the overarching characteristic present among all evangelical Protestants is a literal
interpretation of, and adherence to the Bible. Dollar goes on to note that much of the
evangelical population equates “this literal interpretation of the Bible with belief of the
Bible itself” (Marsden, p25).
Each author who contributed to Dayton and Johnston’s (1991) analysis of
American evangelicalism seems to agree implicitly on a literal interpretation of the Bible
as a characteristic specific to all evangelicals, as opposed to mainstream Protestants.
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Despite the in-depth analysis presented by each of the authors, there is confusion and
dissent with respect to other distinctions between evangelicals and mainstream
Protestants. Only Dayton’s closing note highlights the extreme differences between
evangelical and mainstream worshippers (Dayton, p249). Regardless of this
acknowledgement, Dayton fails to explicitly define a second characteristic that
differentiates the population of evangelical movements from the body of mainstream
movements, besides evangelicals’ adherence to a literal interpretation of the Bible.
Without naming a characteristic that makes these two populations so distinct, Dayton
asserts that they are, indeed, quite different (Dayton, p247). I assert that it is the implied
difference in one’s level of devotion, and its relationship with the ability to strictly adhere
to the teachings of the Bible, that draws much of the line between evangelical and
mainstream Protestants.
This higher level of devotion, commonly found among evangelicals, is manifested
in the discipline needed to adhere to a literal interpretation and worship of the Bible.
Connecting a literal interpretation and the divine authority of the Bible with a higher level
of religiosity is the first step in the creation of a theoretical distinction between
evangelical and mainstream Protestants, especially when using this distinction as a
measure of religiosity. First, this distinction implies that an evangelical form of worship
requires a greater amount of devotion to adhere to religious tenets in such a strict manner.
This difference between mainstream Protestants and evangelical Protestants is the basis
of the religiosity measure used for this analysis.
The pursuit of a literal form of worship connotes that evangelicals not only adhere
to a dispensationalist view of world events, but that they must also attempt to live a
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virtuous life that strictly abides by the tenets set forth in the Bible. Evangelical leader
John Rice describes this lifestyle and form of worship as a focus on “the sole authority of
the Bible, and a separated life of holiness marked by avoidance of notorious bar-room
vices” (Marsden, p23). The idea that no intermediary exists between a worshipper and the
writing of the Bible allows for this more direct, and literal, interpretation of
eschatological, dispensational, and moral underpinnings of the Protestant faith. This
form of worship represents an intimacy with the written word of the Bible without the
intermediaries found in other denominations like Catholicism.
Once a literal and strict interpretation of the Bible’s dispensational,
eschatological, and lifestyle provisos can be equated to evangelicals’ higher level of
devotion, the content of this worship then becomes pertinent to the analysis. If
evangelicals and mainstream Protestants are different in this way, the substance of what
is being adhered to in different degrees becomes quite pertinent. The Biblical basis of
living a life of ‘holiness’ needs little evidence for a reader to understand that a more
devoted, and strictly adhering, worshipper would more likely follow such a lifestyle.
Therefore, to show that more devoted and religious evangelicals would tend to
sympathize with Israel more often, some significance of the State of Israel must be shown
in the Bible. This is important, being that evangelicals hold the Bible in a more literal,
and authoritative, regard than mainstream Protestants.
John Richard Neuhaus’ analysis of Biblical prophecy in “What the
Fundamentalists Want” shows the importance of Israel to the evangelical movement’s
view of things to come (Neuhaus, 1987). Evangelicals’ focus on the dispensationalist
factors of Biblical prophecy places much focus on the role of Israel in the second coming
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of the messiah. Neuhaus plainly states, “Jews are critical to the final act” (Neuhaus,
p14). This statement is later clarified to be referring to the Jewish state of Israel. Citing
Romans 9 through 11, Neuhaus notes that most evangelicals believe that the covenant
between God and the people of Israel implies “that the nation that blesses the Jews will
be blessed and the nation that curses them will be cursed” (Neuhaus, p15). The “precise
blueprint and timetable for the return” of Jesus is a fundamental part of belief system of
devout evangelicals (Neuhaus, p14). While most orthodox Christians believe in these
events, Neuhaus emphasizes their importance to evangelicals’ view of the future and their
faith.
The idea of evangelical groups taking such a vigorous stance in their support of
Israel means that one must, again, examine the nature of the term “evangelism” itself to
gain an appreciation of the their literal adherence to the written word of the Bible. As the
above analyses of scholars have shown, evangelicals distinguish themselves from other
Protestants based on how strictly they follow the content of the Bible. Webster’s Revised
and Unabridged Dictionary defines the term “evangelical” as “pertaining to the strict
adherence to or interpretation of the gospel and the related teachings of the Christian
doctrine” (Webster’s, 1998). Along with this description of the distinction between
evangelicals and mainstream Protestants, there are references to Israel throughout the
communications of evangelical clerics and other religious leaders.
When examining evangelical Protestants and their tendency to support Israel, the
actions and statements of religious leaders and other figureheads are a useful source of
anecdotal evidence. Several authors have examined biblical references and their
consistency with moral issues and candidate characteristics. While evidence of the
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significance of Israel to the Protestant faiths, especially the evangelical movement, is
substantial, a look at the practical and political application of this idea is most clearly
found by examining the actions and statements of religious leaders. This is especially
true for the evangelical Christian right’s support for Israel and the Israel lobby.
Anthony Smith, in Foreign Attachments, gives an in-depth look at some of the
proactive and explicit acts of support that have been directed toward Israel by evangelical
Protestant leaders. To begin with, he describes one instance in 1998 when Jerry Falwell
and other members of the Southern Baptist convention expressed their willingness to
support the cause of the Israeli people and their representatives to Prime Minister
Netanyahu. What they proposed reflects the type of influence coming from the pulpit
that Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) described. Falwell vowed “some 200,000
evangelical pastors would ‘go to the pulpits and use their influence in support of the state
of Israel and the Prime Minister’” (Smith, p120). Falwell dubbed this concerted effort
the “Call for a United Jerusalem.” Smith spends much of his analysis addressing the fact
that these coalitions developed for support are not rare. In fact, they occur between
varieties of groups that happen to agree on the issue of sympathy toward Israel.
Regardless of the interest group, none has reached the scale and effectiveness of the proIsrael lobbies (Smith, p120).
Next to American Jews, conservative Christian groups are the strongest
supporters of Zionism and the State of Israel (Smith, 120). Many of these conservative
groups with which this analysis is concerned are strongly rooted in evangelical tenets. As
many of the authors above have noted, a tendency toward a stricter, more orthodox,
worship among Protestant Christians is highly correlated with evangelicalism. An
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established characteristic of these conservative Christian groups is that they also tend to
vote Republican, as opposed to the Jewish population’s tendency to vote for the
Democratic candidate (Layman, 1997 and Smith, 120). The ability of these two groups
to come together on this topic shows some similarity between their beliefs and the bases
of their faiths.
A tension has existed between the Jewish American community and the
evangelical Christian community because of moral and social issues that surround the
parties typically supported by each group. Smith (2001) shows that the Jewish
population in the United States has been less strict with its support for domestic social
issues that are consistent with a more conservative view of the evangelical doctrine.
Rather, they have voted Democratic when the issue of support for Israel was better
facilitated by such an action. Regardless of this factor, American Jews tend to support
Israel for obvious reasons. Furthermore, evangelical Christian groups support Israel
because of the substance of its doctrine and its relevance to the future of the state of
Israel. Smith addresses these biblical factors by saying:
…Conservative Christian Zionism is far from a recent creation and draws support
from the chiliastic1 Christian beliefs in Armageddon and the Second Coming of
Jesus, prophecies that can only be realized following the return of the Jewish
people to Israel (Smith, 120).
For many, the significance of the existence of the Jewish State cannot be
understated. Its role in the Second Coming, Armageddon, and the Rapture is important to
a number Christians. The importance of this factor aside, much of the support coming
from evangelicals is logical and easily empathized with. Support and sympathy for

1

This term refers to the Christian belief that a period of peace will persist for a thousand years coinciding
with the prominence of the Jewish people and the reign of Jesus. Webster’s Revised Unabridged
Dictionary
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Israeli Jews with common beliefs or similar circumstances facing them pervades every
social setting. These factors, among many others, present sufficient justification for the
active support of Israel by many evangelical religious leaders. It is in the interest of
Protestants and Jews that Israel remains a secure and viable state.
Much of the mechanisms of politicization described by Layman and Wald,
Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) operate on one’s level of adherence to religious doctrine. It
is clear that much of the very nature of being an evangelical Christian implies this
adherence. However, several authors (Layman, 1997; Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993)
note in their analyses that adherence may not merely be a function of denomination or
affiliation. Rather, they seem to assert that it is a product of salience and involvement.
An analysis of simple crosstabs performed on the 2002 ABC News/Washington Post
dataset resulted in significantly different levels of likely sympathy toward Israel among
mainline Protestants and evangelicals who attend church services “at least once a week.”
Given the level of significance attributed to the evangelical distinction by authors like
Green and Guth (1987) and Layman (1997), frequency of attendance alone does not seem
to capture one’s religiosity as it relates to frequency of attendance (i.e. involvement). As
Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) noted in their analysis, frequency of attendance could
merely be measuring attendance, rather than one’s level of devotion (see Fig. 1).
There is a clearer difference in the level of sympathy for Israel when using a
measure that rests purely orientational and associational factors, without the confusion
presented by frequency of attendance. Especially within the issue of sympathy toward
Israel, this analysis argues that when the evangelical distinction is juxtaposed with
mainstream Protestantism, saliency of religion is more clearly measured. My analysis
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contends that the nature of evangelical worship means that a strong majority of devout
and frequently attending mainline Protestants pursue an evangelical form of worship, and
that they would label themselves as such. In the absence of a dataset that contains each
of the measures discussed (frequency of attendance, evangelicalism, and salience), as
well as questions pertaining to Israel, the evangelical distinction within a population of
Protestants is the most valid approach to measuring one’s religiosity.
If proper measurements were to be included in survey data, the implications of the
mechanisms described above could perhaps be seen more clearly with respect to support
for Israel. The robustness of each measure could, therefore, be more accurately
evaluated. Despite this data preference, a direct measure of salience is rarely
accompanied in a data set by a survey question assessing whether or not one is a “born
again evangelical.” For the purposes of this analysis, the self-coded evangelical
distinction will be juxtaposed with mainstream Protestants as a measure of religiosity
within the Protestant faith.
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Methodology and Analysis
There are several factors central to an assessment of sympathy for Israel in the
Arab-Israeli Conflict. Along with religiosity and religious involvement, self-proclaimed
membership and identification with the Republican Party is hypothesized in this analysis
to reinforce preexisting sympathy toward Israel that is based in the religiosity factor. To
capture the effects of being an evangelical protestant, as well as being Republican,
logistical regression was chosen for its ability to calculate the interaction effects of these
variables while comparing to instances where their presence is lacking. Using an ABC
News and Washington Post survey conducted in April of 2002, my analysis will examine
the effects of partisanship and religiosity on Protestants’ likelihood of sympathizing with
Israel (ICPSR, 2002). While partisanship is commonly found in surveys, the use of the
evangelical distinction to differentiate between Protestants of varying degrees of
religiosity made this dataset particularly appropriate.
To accurately assess the effects of elevated religiosity, evangelicalism, Protestant
respondents and Evangelical Protestant respondents are coded accordingly with dummy
variables. Only those denominations fitting the definition of a Protestant faith are coded
“1” for Protestant and “0” for lack of Protestantism. Also, those respondents who state
they are an evangelical Protestant are coded “1” on a separate dummy variable that
accounts for the presence of evangelicalism. To ensure the accuracy of this variable, only
those respondents who were initially coded as Protestant in the first variable are allowed
to respond as being evangelical Protestants. This is to ensure that the evangelical
variable is, in fact, a measure of religiosity with respect to only the Protestant faith.

32

A relatively small number of Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish respondents stated
that they were evangelical Protestants. They were, therefore, deleted from the analysis to
maintain the integrity of the evangelical distinction as a measure of religiosity among
Protestants. Given the concept of evangelicalism that is developed and addressed in the
analysis of the literature above, the coding of this dataset required that agnostics and
atheists be guarded against responding as being evangelical in the same way as Catholics
and Muslims in the dataset. While the frequency of such occurrences is quite infrequent,
such manipulations of the data require noting. The boundaries of evangelicalism, when
acting as a measure of religiosity, need not address the many nuances developed in the
previous sections dealing with different movements or subsets within the evangelical
faith. Using aspects inherent to the evangelical belief and worship structure suffices to
differentiate that population from mainline Protestants.
An analysis of multiple cross-tabulations created the predicted probabilities for
the partisanship and religion variable, before the inclusion of interaction effects between
the two. The significance of the State of Israel within the Protestant faith, regardless of
the presence of evangelicalism as a measure of heightened religiosity, should lead to a
higher probability of sympathy toward Israel for Protestants than Catholics. The
interaction of Catholicism with the partisanship variables should, therefore, show a
persisting lack of any elevation in the probability of sympathizing with Israel, as
compared to the same interactions with partisanship. Being that no measure of religiosity
is applied to the Catholic population in this sample, their comparison with mainstream
Protestants is uneven. Being that evangelicalism is the measure of an elevated level of
religiosity for the purposes of this analysis, the Protestant population largely consists of
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the Protestants that possess a lesser degree of religiosity. The Catholic population
consists of both. The results of this comparison will likely persist through the inclusion
of interaction effects with measures of partisanship.
The presence of the evangelical variable is the measure of elevated religiosity in
this analysis. This measure should be especially effective when juxtaposed with a
mainline Protestant variable that excludes evangelical Protestants. The orientational
threshold is one factor that separates these respondents in religiosity terms from nonevangelical Protestants. Furthermore, the involvement and attendance measures of
religiosity are met by the evangelical distinction. A statistically significant larger portion
of Evangelicals in this dataset attends religious services at least once a week than do the
mainstream Protestant respondents. Absent a direct salience question in this dataset, it is
impossible to say whether the evangelical distinction would also serve as a substitute for
this direct survey measure of religiosity. Regardless, problems with its subjective nature
preclude the direct saliency question from being used as a viable measure in this analysis.
Variables for being a Republican, Democrat, and Independent were also created.
These variables account for the partisanship of the respondents and will make up
interaction variables, along with variable accounting for religiosity. Their predicted
probabilities were derived from the same method of simple cross-tabulations as used for
the measures of religiosity. Another set of variables was also created to account for the
ideology of respondents. Due a lack of significance among any of the variables
accounting for liberals, conservatives, and moderates in a single model logistical
regression including all variables, these categories were removed from the analysis.
Further research will be required to show why ideology failed to gain significance similar
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to that of partisanship. Both remaining sets of variables, (religiosity and partisanship),
were coded as dummy variables using the same methodological precautions as noted
above.
Only those respondents who definitively stated that they belonged to any of the
categories were coded as such. Those respondents who said, “Don’t know”, “Neither”,
or “Other” were coded along with the respondents that did not possess the attribute
assessed by the respective dummy variable of interest. This was done to ensure that each
respondent identified with the respective variable enough to respond definitively. Unsure
responses that do not connote a clear and strong association with a particular group or
identity were removed. Merely coding these respondents as “0” would cloud the final
results of the regression. Rather, these respondents were coded as “System Missing.”
To effectively capture the effect partisanship has on the measures of religiosity,
and vice versa, a logistical regression model was designed to produce the six interaction
variable results of interest:
Republican Evangelicals

Democratic Evangelicals

Republican Protestants

Democratic Protestants

Republican Catholics

Democratic Catholics

The results from the interactions with Independents are withheld from the remainder of
the analysis because they are largely peripheral to the research question at hand.
Furthermore, the predicted probabilities from each measure of religiosity interacting with
the Independents mirrored those of the Democrats’. The distinctions that are significant
to this analysis are those between the Democratic and Republican respondents. The
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effects of constituency and party politics are important to this analysis. They are,
however, lacking in the case of the Independent respondents.
The logistical regression models designed to capture the interactions above
included a dummy variable for each of the religiosity and partisanship variables. They
also included four of the interaction variables listed above. The interaction variables for
Republican Protestants and Democratic Protestants were withheld from both models as
part of the control groups. As the other control measure, the individual dummy variable
values for Protestants and Catholics were each withheld from one of the two logistical
regression models. These two control measures allow the results of the logistical
regression models to produce predicted probabilities that accurately show values of each
variable in relationship to each other.
Since each of the variables used for this analysis is a dummy variable,
manipulating the values of each variable between 1 and 0 allowed for the production of a
predicted probability for each of the six interaction variables. The predicted probabilities
for the excluded Republican Protestants and Democratic Protestants were obtained by
including only the parameters for the four individual variables that make up these
interactions. The probabilities obtained through this method are coupled with the results
of the cross-tabulations of the individual dummy variables to produce the results for this
analysis.
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Results
Table 1: Predicted Probabilities of Sympathizing with Israel.
Evangelicals
Protestants
Catholics

61%
43.6%
44.7%

Republican Evangelicals
Republican Protestants
Republican Catholics

82.9%
59%
51.6%

Republican
Democrat
Independent

61.1%
47.8%
44.7%

Democratic Evangelicals
Democratic Protestants
Democratic Catholics

53.1%
39.7%
51.4%

The results of this analysis clearly demonstrate the hypothesized effects of
religiosity and partisanship. Factors inherent to an evangelical worshipper’s view of the
Protestant doctrine place increased importance on the existence and integrity of the State
of Israel. While Israel’s safety is significant for Protestant and non-Protestant
worshippers, it is of particular importance to evangelical Protestants. The importance of
sympathy and support for Israel within the self-proclaimed evangelical community has
become increasingly explicit, as anecdotal Biblical evidence has shown. With the
distinction between evangelical and non-evangelical Protestants serving as this analysis’
measure of religiosity, the presence of the evangelical distinction among respondents
should result in an elevated level of sympathy toward Israel.
Evangelicals in this dataset are approximately 17% more likely to be sympathetic
toward Israel than mainstream Protestants. This difference between the two groups
indicates that evangelicals have a 61% probability of sympathizing with Israel, regardless
of partisanship. Protestants, regardless of partisanship, have approximately a 43.6%
probability of sympathizing with Israel. As mainstream Protestant respondents increase
their level of religiosity (i.e. respond as being evangelical) their likelihood of
sympathizing with Israel increases from 43.6% to 61%. While this distinct difference is
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consistent with the hypothesis, some interesting relationships do present themselves when
comparing Catholics with Protestants. These relationships persist even after the
interaction effects of partisanship are injected in later models.
Doctrinal characteristics inherent to the Protestant faith were hypothesized to
result in a higher level of sympathy toward Israel for those worshippers. However, each
model analyzed showed a lack of a significant difference between Catholics and
Protestants on their likelihood of sympathizing with Israel. A superficial look at these
results may cause one to conclude that the Protestant faith has no significant relationship
to Israel. This lack of a significant difference also showed up in the interaction variables
that addressed religion and partisanship. However, there are a couple of explanations for
this inconsistency with the hypothesis. First, there are 265 Protestants and 284 Catholics.
This number of Protestants does not include evangelical Protestants. Once evangelicals
are removed from the Protestant population, it is logical that those who remain coded as
mainstream Protestants are relatively less devout than the most devout being coded as
evangelical. On the other hand, the population of Catholics in this sample has not had a
group of more religious respondents extracted from it. It is this inclusion of more devout
Catholics, and the exclusion of the devout evangelicals from the Protestant populations,
that is creating the higher probability of Catholics sympathizing with Israel.
Secondly, this effect could be the result of the described difference between
evangelicals and mainstream Protestants. Perhaps mainstream Protestants are not
sensitized enough to the contents of the Protestant doctrine and the message reinforced by
political parties and religious leaders. This hypothesized lack of sensitization is a result
of a relatively low level of religiosity when compared to evangelical Protestants.
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Furthermore, the coding of evangelicals separately from mainstream Protestants has
effectively removed the most religious respondents from the dataset. This extraction of
the evangelical population is also noted as a possible explanation for the lack of
difference between Catholics and mainstream Protestants above. Since the remaining
mainstream Protestants are hypothesized to be less devout than evangelicals who are
coded separately, any phenomena related to religiosity may be difficult to detect among
such a broad and heterogeneous group. Regardless, the higher probability of sympathy
among Catholics, relative to Protestants, does not persist consistently when partisanship
is included as an interaction variable (see Table 1).
When Republican Party membership interacts with Protestantism there is only a
7.4% higher probability of sympathizing with Israel than if one were a Catholic
Republican (see Table 1). This is consistent with the hypotheses. Since Layman (1997)
and others have found that more devout and orthodox worshipper tend to identify with
the Republican Party, the interaction of Republicanism with Protestantism would likely
be applicable to those respondents with a relatively high level of religiosity. Hence, the
interaction variable is measuring the sympathy of the most devout mainstream
Protestants. The inherent significance of Israel in the Protestant faith is consistent with
the higher probability of sympathy for Protestant Republicans, relative to Catholic
Republicans: 59% versus 51.6% probability of sympathizing with Israel, respectively.
As a result, when Republicanism interacts with Catholicism the same factors of
religiosity and doctrine that were operable for the Protestant population do not apply.
While more devout Catholics may tend toward the Republican Party because of domestic
social issues, the issue of Israel may not be as prominent of an aspect in their faith.
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Furthermore, the communalistic conflict described by Wald, Kellstedt, Leege (1993)
above may draw some of the most devout and conservative Catholics to the Democratic
Party. This would further reduce the effect of the interaction with partisanship when
considering the prominence of Israel among those Catholics of relatively high levels of
religiosity. Catholics would not register as being as sympathetic because they are not
witness to the politically driven message disseminated through the Protestant or
evangelical communities by the Republican Party attempting to maintain its Protestant
and evangelical constituents. On the other hand, when partisanship is examined alone,
Republicanism is indicative of an elevated probability of sympathy toward Israel.
As noted in Smith’s Foreign Attachments and other pieces of literature above,
both the Democratic and Republican Parties espouse comparable levels of support for
Israel (Smith, p120-22). Therefore, it is not a matter of which party to which a person
proscribes. Rather, it is a function of how important that party’s views are to the
respondent. In the context of this study, the importance of a party’s views to a person is
hypothesized to be a function of religiosity. As noted in the literature review and
theoretical sections, religious views of relatively highly devout Evangelicals will drive
them to the Republican Party (Layman, 1997). The significance of the State of Israel and
pertinent domestic social issues causes respondents to adhere to party views based on the
religiosity of that respondent. The same religiosity that caused evangelicals to label
themselves as Republicans, because of the importance of domestic social issues, causes
them to be slightly more sympathetic toward Israel. This is a result of Israel’s significant
role in the evangelical Protestant faith.
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The effects of partisanship, alone, mirror the role of domestic social issues as
theorized above. Regardless of religion or religiosity, Republicans in this dataset have a
61.1% probability of sympathizing with Israel. On the other hand, a similar Democrat
has a 47.8% chance of sympathizing with Israel. In terms of domestic social issues and
the importance of the State of Israel driving devout Protestants and evangelical
Protestants to the Republican Party, several incentives exist for Republicanism to have an
increased effect. While the support of each party for the State of Israel has been
characterized as somewhat equal in degree, its manifestation and translation may
logically differ. This is due to the parties’ conscious evaluation of its constituency, as
mentioned above.
Accordingly, evangelical Republicans should be more likely to be sympathetic
toward Israel than any other group of respondents. This assertion operates on more than
just the evangelical distinction alone. In addition, the position of sympathy toward Israel
espoused by the Republican Party should also be of elevated importance because of the
connection the party has with the evangelical worshipper. That constituency
maintenance, which is initially based on domestic social issues, is also operable for the
issue of sympathy toward Israel. Those evangelicals who respond as being Republican
are hypothesized to be the most devout. This is because no issue central to their religious
doctrine has been set aside when comparing parties with the stipulations of their religious
faith. Similarly, the lack of a significant relationship between Republicanism and
Evangelicalism in this dataset could be explained by a variety of factors other than
economic.
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Similar to the communalistic tension noted in the example of Catholicism that
Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) gave, a large majority of Evangelical households in
the 2002 ABC News/Washington Post data make less than $75,000 a year. Most of those
households bring home less than $50,000 a year. This factor would logically draw more
Evangelicals to the Democratic Party because of “bread and butter” issues related to their
income and tax bracket. While such issues as income may take precedence over some
domestic social issues of importance to evangelicals, this data shows that sympathy
towards Israel is persistent among all evangelicals, regardless of their partisanship. There
is also no statistically significant relationship between income and evangelicalism.
Therefore, in relationship to other issues like income that may drive a respondent to
another party, the issue of sympathy toward Israel persists at the top of the hierarchy for
most evangelicals.
When considering the increased emphasis on the issue of sympathy toward Israel
that the Republican Party has been theorized to show, interaction effects between
religiosity and partisanship should be significant. As a respondent increases in religiosity
(i.e. responds as being evangelical) the effect of Republicanism should grow, because of
their receptiveness to the partisan message and the actual religious characteristics of that
population. This is a result of increased prominence placed on the State of Israel by
evangelicals interacting with a reinforcing message from Republican leaders trying to
maintain that constituency (see Table 1).
Consistent with the theory of reinforcing factors of religion and partisanship,
Evangelical Republicans show the highest level of sympathy toward Israel of any other
group of respondents. Evangelical Republican respondents in this dataset have an 82.9%
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probability of being sympathetic toward Israel. This is more than 23% more likely than
non-evangelical Protestant Republicans, and more than 29% more likely than Evangelical
Democrats to be sympathetic toward Israel. The prominence of Israel in the evangelical
Protestant faith, regardless of partisanship, provides the third highest probability of
sympathizing with Israel, at 61%. It is exceeded only be Republicans and Evangelical
Republicans who have a 61.1% and 82.9% probability of sympathizing with Israel,
respectively. The only variable that increases this already high probability is the
inclusion of the Republicanism variable as an interaction effect. The persistent
importance of sympathy toward the State of Israel among evangelicals causes
respondents in each category of partisanship to increase their probability of sympathizing
with Israel by at least a 13.4% when they respond as being evangelicals.
Several final conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, sympathy toward
Israel is very near the top of the hierarchy of issues for all evangelicals, regardless of
partisanship. Even for those respondents who are Democrats, sympathy toward Israel
remains a clear position. It is only slightly decreased by a lack of reinforcing influence
from their political party. Secondly, Republicanism reinforces the inherent importance of
the State of Israel to evangelical respondents. This is due to the Republican Party’s
active efforts to maintain that constituency, or because other characteristics of the party
draw only the more devout among Protestants. And, as shown throughout the analysis,
the more devout Protestants tend to hold Israel in a more sympathetic light. Implicit in
this notion is the idea that the Republican Party should have the effect of elevating levels
of sympathy among more than just evangelical Protestants.
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That there is an active message originating from the Republican Party focused on
the issue of sympathy toward Israel and the maintenance its evangelical constituency, it is
logical that the same message will have an effect on non-evangelical Protestant party
members. This mechanism refers to the idea of constituency maintenance. Those
members are present at the same worship ceremonies and subject to similar influences
that result from any concerted and explicit party-based message. Clergy members,
largely independent of active party involvement, pursue the transmission and
dissemination of this politically charged message. As Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993)
noted, these influences are reinforced “communally”. This is evident in the distinct
difference between Protestants of different parties.
Regardless, Republicanism has the expected effect of drawing or reinforcing a
sympathetic view toward Israel. This is due to a party message, or the ability of the party
to draw a particular worshipper. More importantly, this difference from the Democratic
Party’s effect results from the evangelical constituency the Republican Party must
maintain. Therefore, this analysis contends that the growing power of the evangelical
constituency contains factors within itself that are inherently supportive of Israel.
Furthermore, that attentive constituency has the indirect effect of helping to formulate a
more sympathetic tone of the Republican Party toward Israel. This message differs from
the more general rhetoric that has caused people like Smith to assert that the Democratic
and Republican Parties espouse comparable levels of sympathy toward Israel (Smith,
p120-122). Because of how this pro-Israel message is disseminated by political and
religious leaders, other groups like Catholics and mainstream Protestants are also
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influenced. This is seen in the interaction effects those groups have when combined with
Republicanism.
The only single group of respondents in any model that compares with the
Republicans’ probability of sympathizing with Israel is the evangelicals. Since nearly
half of evangelical respondents were coded as democrats, the persistent strength of the
evangelical distinction regardless of partisanship must be considered. The idea of
constituency maintenance by the Republican Party and, in turn, its reinforcement of that
group’s views has significant implications for American foreign policy. A group of
constituents shaping the platform of a political party with regards to domestic policy is
nothing new. However, a group of constituents acting as an interest group rarely delve
into foreign policy affairs. Bard, in Wittkopf’s The Domestic Sources of American
Foreign Policy, asserts that this is because foreign policy rarely has a direct impact on
any single group of citizens. He notes that such attempts to influence party position, and
thus foreign policy, are more often the goals of corporations focused around specific
policy issues (Bard in Wittkopf, p92). According to these data, however, evangelicals
have succeeded in becoming a vital constituency of the Republican Party. This
constituency, whether based on domestic social issues or sympathy toward Israel, has
also had the effect of increasing the Republican Party’s level of sympathy toward Israel
as it is presented to that same constituency. These groups are mutually reinforcing, and
strongly sympathetic toward Israel.
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Implications
Bard notes that there has been a consensus of sympathy with regard to
Americans’ views toward Israel. This sympathy has been in place since the 1967 War.
Similarly, favorable American foreign policies have also persisted since that time (Bard
in Wittkopf, p82). In an attempt to measure the actual effectiveness that interest groups
have on American foreign policy, Bard analyzes AIPAC and its effects on AmericanMiddle East relations. Given that the persistent consensus of sympathy toward Israel,
and that Arab sympathy in this country has averaged 11%, it is apparent that foreign
policy decision makers are operating within a set range of policy options. That range
only includes options of relative preference toward Israel. Rarely, if ever, could a
politician pursue a policy that is clearly unfavorable to Israel. Public opinion and
electoral pressures from interest groups are commonly noted as the prohibitive factors
(Bard in Wittkopf, p86).
Richard Sobel, in The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy, described
public opinion as “a system of dikes.” This “system of dikes” is best conceived of as a
range of options in a spectrum. “Dikes” border that range of acceptability. Therefore,
public opinion has the ability to set limits on available policy choices within that range
(Sobel, p25). In the context of Bard’s consensus of sympathy, it is logical that a
politician or party could not stray too far to the edges of this accepted posture towards
Israel. The basis of this consensus of sympathy and how it gets it power is the core of
much of American foreign policy directed at the Middle East.
The consensus of sympathy toward Israel that exists is maintained by general
public opinion and the efforts of the Israel lobby groups. American Jews and the
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American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) carry out the bulk of this workload
(Bard in Wittkopf, p80). While Jewish-Americans number 6 million, and reside in 12
electoral states that are alone capable of deciding the presidency, they rely on the efforts
of other groups sympathetic to the State of Israel (Bard in Wittkopf, p83). Operating
within this context of relative sympathy toward Israel, Bard notes that there are still a
number of specific policy actions that have the potential to significantly affect inter-state
relations and the balance of power in the region (Bard in Wittkopf, p84). Bard’s analysis
centers on the efforts of AIPAC and other pro-Israel groups’ efforts to broker arms deals
favorable to Israel. Throughout his analysis, however, Bard never names the sources of
AIPAC’s influence or the vital groups upon which it “depends.” Rather, Bard seems to
place evangelicals within the informal “Jewish Lobby” that includes “individuals and
organizations that directly or indirectly influence American policy to support Israel”
(Bard in Wittkopf, 1994, p80)
My analysis serves to highlight groups, other than Jewish Americans, that
comprise much of the influence projected upon American foreign policy toward the
Middle East. These mechanisms have gone further than a general public opinion
consensus to sympathize with Israel through American foreign policy. Numbering more
than 100 million (USA Today, 2004), evangelicals logically account for much of what
Jewish Americans depend on when attempting to attain the most favorable policy
outcomes for Israel. While policy makers face ramifications when they choose to oppose
policies favorable to Israel or advocate policies favorable to surrounding Arab states,
these ramifications do not originate solely from the Jewish American constituency (Bard
in Wittkopf, p86). The active and explicit efforts of evangelical leaders to support the
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efforts of Israeli leaders and pro-Israel lobbyists have been clearly noted in this analysis.
These efforts will ensure that the policies directed toward the Middle East will
increasingly favor Israel, regardless of a broad and general public consensus of sympathy
throughout the U.S.
This predicted trend toward a relatively more favorable set of policies directed at
Israel points to a paradox Bard briefly acknowledged. The United States’ consensus of
sympathy toward Israel has had significant effects on relations in the Middle East and the
Arab world. One of the commonly known rationales for fundamentalist terrorist groups’
actions is U.S. support for the State of Israel. Groups like Al Qaeda have based much of
their motivation on ending this relationship (Scheuer, 2004). They intend to do this by
showing the U.S. that supporting Israel brings with it costs and is not in their interest.
Fatwas delivered by terrorist leaders like Ossama bin Laden have explicitly addressed
this rationale (Scheuer, 2004). However distant, such threats do fall into the realm of
foreign policy choices that affect the average American citizen, indirectly or not. While
this indirect cause of terrorist activity is not the only catalyst, the paradox that relates to
oil more directly affects American actors.
Bard briefly addresses the paradox between foreign policy toward Israel, which
results in part from interest groups and public opinion, and the embittered Arab states that
are often the result. The ambassador to Kuwait was quoted in 1983 as saying, “American
businessmen must understand that their success in the Mideast hinges on how the U.S.
deals with Israel” (Bard in Wittkopf, p92). Consequently, oil companies have felt the
brunt of the consensus of sympathy that the U.S. holds for Israel. Bard notes that several
oil companies have attempted to appeal purely to American national interests when siding
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with Arabs on oil deals and development. While the oil industry has seen quite a bit
more success than the arms industry, they remain virtually alone among U.S. economic
interests that have succeeded against the interest groups and public opinion discussed
here (Bard in Wittkopf, p92).
With the growing cleavage between orthodox and liberal worshippers, the power
of the evangelical movement seems likely to increase. It seems logical that a trend
toward policies that are in any way unfavorable to Israel is unlikely. This will be true
until the two paradoxes described above become a stronger threat to U.S. national interest
than the interests of Protestants and evangelical populations above. Being that politicians
face repercussions if they stray from the range of acceptable policies (Bard, p86), it is
evident that factors like terrorism or oil prices must reach a certain level of peril. These
threats, be they oil or terrorism based, must directly affect the U.S. citizenry in a way that
trumps the interests and effects that groups like the evangelical Protestants have been
mobilized around. Only then will politicians be able to confidently justify diverging from
the religion-based pressures exerted by groups like AIPAC and the evangelical
movement.
Regardless of these pressures and ramifications that are integral to such a costbenefit analysis, the support from the evangelical groups and political parties described
here cannot accurately be measured. Their actual effectiveness, with regard to the
creation of these paradoxes of American national interest, will likely go untested or
unnoticed for the near future. Such factors seem too difficult to quantify, despite studies
like Bard’s. Short of a grave and direct threat to specific American national interests, the
power, access, and influence granted to interest groups will remain unchecked. With
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respect to evangelicals, this influence over AIPAC and American foreign policy toward
Israel will likely grow with their population.
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Appendix A: Comparison and Characteristics of Religiosity Measures

Measures of Religiosity
Frequency of Attendance or
Involvement

Pros
- One can argue that it is
accurately measuring one’s
religiosity i.e. involvement.
- One can argue that it is a
measure of religiosity that is
applicable across
denominations.

Saliency Question

Orthodoxy of Worship

- One can argue that it is a
measure of religiosity that is
applicable across
denominations.
- Provides a measure of one’s
religiosity based on adherence
and is inherently in
comparison to those
respondents who do not code
as being orthodox.
- Is not subjective, and
operates on a nominal
distinction rather than one’s
own valuation.
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Cons
- Does not always measure
devotional nature of religiosity.
Rather, it may merely be
measuring one’s habit, or
tradition, of attendance i.e.
“Going through the motions.”
- Gives undue weight to
religious traditions that stipulate
mid-week worship attendance
i.e. evangelicals.
- Is highly subjective, and does
not provide a viable measure of
religiosity across respondents.
- This distinction cannot be
applied across denominations.
It is most effectively applied to
the Jewish faith. Within the
Protestant denominations, the
evangelical distinction
effectively differentiates
‘orthodox’ respondents from
mainline Protestants along lines
of adherence.

Appendix B: Similarity in Salience Across Traditions of Attendance

1

2

3

Attendance per week (days)
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Evangelicals

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Mainstream Protestants

Salience of religion for
respondent

Possible coding of respondents with respect to salience and frequency of
attendance survey questions.
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Appendix C: Independent Variable Coding
Religiosity:
Catholic
Protestant
Evangelical
Protestant
Partisanship:
Democrat
Independent
Republican

1-Presence
0-Absence
1-Presence
0-Absence
1-Presence
0-Absence
1-Presence
0-Absence
1-Presence
0-Absence
1-Presence
0-Absence

Ideology:
Liberal

1-Presence
0-Absence
Moderate
1-Presence
0-Absence
Conservative 1-Presence
0-Absence

Only those respondents who clearly definitively stated that they possessed the
respective attribute are coded with a “1”. Only those respondents who clearly and
definitively stated they did not possess the respective attribute were coded as “0”. Those
who responded “Don’t know”, “Neither”, or “Other” were coded as “System Missing” in
order to gain a clearer picture of the effects of the presence of the specific attribute.
Inclusion of respondents who do not cleanly fit into the categories outlined by the
respective variable will not accurately represent the hypothesized effect of that variable,
if it indeed exists.
Finally, only those respondents who were classified as Protestant could be categorized as
evangelical Protestants. This precaution prevented non-Protestants, Muslims, Jews, and
Atheists from responding in the affirmative when questioned about their evangelical
status. This has the effect of preserving the distinction between Protestants and
evangelicals that operates along a gradient of religiosity. When juxtaposed in this
manner, the evangelical distinction most accurately serves as a measure of religiosity.
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Appendix D: Dependent Variable Coding
Sym1:
Sympathy for Israel

1-Presence
0-Absence

Survey Question #7:
“In the Middle East, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the
Palestinian Authority?”
1 Israel
2 Palestinian Authority
3 Both (voluntarily)
4 Neither (voluntarily)
DK No Opinion
NA Refused
Only those respondents who were coded as stating “1” as their answer to the actual
survey question were coded as “1” for the purposes of the analysis. Those respondents
who sympathized with the Palestinian Authority (“2”) were coded “0”. Along with
Palestinian Authority sympathizers, those respondents who stated they sympathized with
“Both” or “Neither” were coded as “0”. Furthermore, those respondents who had “No
Opinion” were also coded “0” along with the Palestinian Authority sympathizers. No
respondents “Refused” to answer the survey question. The coding of this variable was
executed this way in order to capture only those respondents who clearly and definitively
sympathize with Israel. Regardless of whether or not they sympathize with the
Palestinian Authority instead, or not, this dummy variable is designed to only capture the
presence of sympathy toward Israel and lack thereof. Therefore, those who have been
coded “0” lack some motivation that would cause them to respond as sympathetic toward
Israel, whether they favor the Palestinian Authority or not.
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Appendix E: Exclusion of Ideology Variables
Model 1.
Protestant
Evangelical
Republican
Independent
Liberal
Moderate
Constant

B
-.179
.612
.722
-.035
.018
.265
-.364

Significance
.319
.000
.000
.842
.934
.116
.072

B
.661
-.044
.760
.038
-.238
-.249
-.191

Significance
.000
.799
.000
.828
.224
.138
.263

Model 2.
Evangelical
Catholic
Republican
Democrat
Liberal
Conservative
Constant

As noted in the analysis, the variables created for ideology failed to obtain any
statistically significant difference. This could be the result of survey structure or
wording. Regardless, it appears as though the respondents in this dataset did not make
the traditional connections between partisanship and ideology. These variables were
subsequently removed from the logistical regression models.
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Appendix F: Logistical Regression Models

Model 1

Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Republican
Independent
Democrat
Repub&Evang
Evang&Dem
Repub&Cath
Dem&Cath
Constant

Model 2
Parameter

Sig

-0.163
0.385
0.00E+00
0.773
0.086
0
0.722
0.04
-0.405
0.356
-0.3

.449
.163

Parameter
Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Republican
Independent
Democrat
Repub&Evang
Evang&Dem
Repub&Cath
Dem&Cath
Constant

.008
.747
.103
.919
.218
.305
.255

0
0.322
-2.63E-01
0.515
0
-0.266
0.894
0.22
-0.034
0.736
-0.151

Sig
.280
.365
.070
.367
.053
.594
.936
.083
.457

This table presents the values and parameters for both models. They are shown in
the exact form as used to calculate predicted probabilities in the Microsoft Excel
program. Note the exclusion of the individual and interaction control variables, as well
as the ideology variables.
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